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Information × Registration Number 2112U005470, Article popup.category Стаття Title Аналіз олігополістичної моделі ринку (на прикладі ринку електроенергії в Мексиці) popup.author Kalashnikov V. V.Kavun S. V.Калашников В. В.Кавун С. В. popup.publication 01-01-2012 popup.source_user Харківський національний економічний університет імені Семена Кузнеця popup.source http://www.repository.hneu.edu.ua/jspui/handle/123456789/1337 popup.publisher ХНЕУ ім. С. Кузнеця Description In this article, research of electricity market oligopolistic model, applied in Mexico, has been carried out and their results have been analyzed. Mexican electricity market is currently a monopoly regulated by the government (a competitive market has not been established yet). Thus, the given article can be evaluated as an empirical study of possible liberalization effects on Mexico. Analysis of the current electricity market has been conducted, the market structure (oligopolistic market), characterized not only by mutual influence on the market share price and government influence level, but a limited number of power suppliers on the market, has been explained. With the help of Cournot-Nash model electric companies maximize their profit and expand their market shares. For the comparison, we also introduce the notion of perfect competition, where each agent acts as a price taker equalizing prices and marginal costs in order to determine and maximize its profit has been introduced. The computational game theory, composed of mixed complementary problems (MCP), solved by the GAMS (www.gams.com) with the application of PATH algorithm has been offered as a modeling tool. It has been applied to the primary data of the Mexican electricity market data to obtain Nash equilibrium and Cournot cases as well as development scenario of the USA international open trade market. popup.nrat_date 2026-02-04 Close